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Abstract 
Underpinning the philosophy of governments (whatever their types 
are the provision of ‘good life’ and maintenance of law and order, the absence of which is a relapse into ‘the 
state of nature’. This therefore presupposes that government does not only fork itself into various institutions, 
each constitutionally charged with specific functi
government institutionalizes power-
and will function; hence, the philosophy behind adoption of either a unitary or federal syst
over. Premising its argument on these phenomena and reviewing necessary literature for easy contribution to the 
on-going debate on police power in Nigeria, the paper relies on documentary method of study. It argues that 
police organization or control does not only strike a difference between unitarism and federalism but also the 
difference has significant implications on the Nigerian national security. The paper concludes by stressing that 
effective policing or effective maintenance o
state like Nigeria requires that its components’ chief security officers are so not only in theory but also 
essentially in praxis; and to this end, argues for a decentralized police force. 
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1. Introduction 
From the etymology of government, it is easily discernible that its (government) various institutions are put in 
place to ensure good life and forestall any rela
Observers of the Nigerian state of security will easily find it very disturbing that despite the fact that the police 
responsibilities of maintaining public peace, safety and general s
constitutionally stipulated, the spate of insecurity in Nigeria, most especially since the return of democracy in 1999, 
can pass for a State of Nature.  
Events of insecurity in well over a decade of democratic
of Nigerians by the sect, Boko Haram
The police has not been useful or helpful in promoting its own image before the general public as
persistent cases of violent robbery, inter
political assassinations. These constitute major internal threats to public order, maintenance of peace and 
security. Mostly, these are blamed on the ineptitude and inefficiency in the performance of police statutory 
duties. The civil society as a result tends to find solace in ethnic militias and other ‘self
provide the much-needed security for thei
However, what succinctly are the objectives of this study? Since Nigeria’s renewed attempt at democratic 
polity 1999 (and) with enthusiasm comparable to the mood in the country on the eve of national indepen
1960 (Aina 2004), the issue of a balanced federal structure that guarantees atmosphere for the full realization of 
the diverse potentials of the federating units, has dominated political discourses. The current federal structure 
seems to lack the capacity to place some control on extreme centripetal forces (police power inclusive) which 
consequently make our federalism too limiting and constricting to the federating states. The study therefore 
revolves around two primary objectives. The first is to
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pse into a situation where life is brutish, solitary, nasty and short.  
ecurity of Nigerians within its boundaries are 
 dispensation and the present bombing and killing 
, confirm a total breakdown of public order and security in the country. 
-ethnic conflicts religious crises, extra-judicial killings by security agents, 
-
r lives and property (Ajayi and Aderinto, 2008).
 investigate the problem/situation of police power in a 
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federal bargain where the federating units did not create the federal/central government. And the second attempts 
a fresh and different investigation into the nature of police organization as one of t
between federalism and unitarism. 
Given the Nigerian present state of insecurity and the seeming incapacitation of the law enforcement 
agencies (especially the police), to restore normalcy, the following hypothetical statements a
from the objectives: (1) In a federal bargain where police power is centralized, the state governors are chief 
security officers only in theory not in practice. (2) In a federation, police power is usually a shared power, 
occasionally concurrent or joint, but actually federal. (3)The more centralized the formation of police 
organization a federation adopts, the less federal the political organization ends up being. We should note that 
the above hypotheses are not formulated to be tested
designed to further buttress the central theme of the study and to help structure the study’s contribution to 
existing knowledge on federal bargain and police power.
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Theories are required in every academic discipline in order to have guided research, and to provide foundations 
for analyses. Theory is “systemic reflection on phenomena, designed to explain them and to show how they are 
related to each other in a meaningful, intell
universe” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2004:17). Thus, as a basis for explanation, the study adopted General 
Systems Theory. We must note at once that systems analysis, though notable toda
originate from the discipline. Taking root from the writings of Ludwig Von Bertallanffy (a Biologist), it has 
taken analytical excursions through Anthropology, Sociology to Political Science. A system as conceived by 
Osaghae (1988) “is an abstract constructed to represent what goes on in real world for purposes of analysis”. He 
noted further that for any system to be called system, it must have five major characteristics of systems:
a. A system is made of parts. 
b. Each of these parts performs important functions which sustain the system and ensures its survival.
c. The parts interact, that is, they have patterned relationships.
d. The parts are interdependent, meaning that what happens in one part directly or indirectly affects the othe
parts. 
e. A system has boundaries which may either be concrete or abstract.
The relevance of the systems theory to our study stems directly from the fact that systems “emphasize 
relationships and not individuals” (Olaniyi, 2001:70). Given the fact that syst
it can aptly explain Federal-State relations that we undertake in this study. The Federal
police control is concerned, are such of stress. They have made demands for security (which is of co
pivotal contractual role of government) stemming, at once, from decentralization of police power, imperative. For 
the Nigerian federal system to attain harmony, integration and equilibrium within its boundaries, police power 
must not be centripetal, but rather diffused into federating states’ controlled police.
 
3. Issue-Specific Conceptualization of Federalism
The central issue, which this work seeks to examine, is the issue of location of police powers in federal systems. 
However, an attempt must be made first to conceptualize the nature of federalism before situating police powers 
in it. Federalism is a process and practical means of organizing political powers in territorially delineated and 
ethno-culturally heterogeneous entities. To Suberu (1989)
to power dispersion is widely regarded as the key feature of the federal bargain and it is usually accompanied by 
a number of constitutional attributes and institutional devices. Arend Lijphart (198
has identified five of these: 
i. A written constitution which specifies the division of power and guarantees to both the central 
and regional governments that their allotted powers cannot be taken away;
ii. A bicameral legislature i
component units of the federation;
iii.  Over-representation of the smaller component units in the federal, chamber of the bicameral 
legislature. 
iv. The right of the component units to be invol
constitution and to change their own constitutions unilaterally
v. Decentralization government in which the regional governments’ share of power is relatively 
large compared with that of regional governments in unita
Federalism is generally regarded - with justification 
government. This is because in contrast with unitary systems, federalism is a goal oriented ‘man
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which entails carefully designed, constitutional crafting and unique instrumentalities (Osaghae 2006).Paramount 
to the federal studies, therefore, is the careful examination of the conditions that precipitate the adoption of 
federal systems as against the unitary systems; how 
(non-centralization) Elazar 1981, as quoted by Suberu (1989), is constitutionally clearly stipulated. 
To this extent, what broadly distinguishes federal systems from unitary systems is that legislat
rests with the central government in a unitary system, but is divided and shared between the different levels of 
government in a federal system. The division of powers in a federal system is generally governed by a 
constitution. In a federal system of government, sovereignty is shared and powers divided between two or more 
levels of government each of which enjoys a direct relationship with the people.
 
4. Police powers and Federal Systems
We next turn to police powers. Police organization is normall
(unitary) and non-centralizing (federal) systems. A common feature to both unitary and federal systems is a 
centralized military whose origin, formation and function(s) are premised on state’s monopoly of the 
However, in a non-centralized political system, police power is so diffused that it cannot be legitimately 
centralized or concentrated without breaking the constitution of federation. The variation to the above is as 
Ayoade (1996) observes that in a federation under military rule, the Center is independent of, and superior to, the 
states. Federations under elective civilian administrations are different because the Center is linked to the 
constituent states and co-equal to them in their resp
However, to understand the sources of police powers, the allocation of jurisdiction, and administration of 
justice, we must have some understanding of the federal systems under which it operates. This is because not all 
systems that claim to be operating federalism are federal in the real sense of the concept, especially when the 
issue of police powers is brought to the fore. Police power, in an ideal federalism, is usually a shared power, 
occasionally concurrent or joint, but re
federation adopts, the less federal the political organization ends up being. The corollary to the above, where we 
have a constitutionally established unitary state that decentralize
a state to run what is close to genuinely federal political arrangement. Federalism generally, refers to a 
government with at least two layers of government so that they can check and balance each other o
manner, no one level becomes too powerful. To underscore the foregoing, brief instances are cited from Canada, 
Australia and the United States of America. 
The administration of policing in Canada is diffused because it involves three levels of
federal government, as empowered by the constitution, has established a federal police force, the RCMP, which 
has jurisdiction over all federal laws throughout each province and territory of Canada. While each of the 
provinces has the power to establish their respective provincial police forces, only the province of Ontario and 
Quebec have exercised that right. The other provinces have opted to contract with the federal government 
through various provincial attorneys general. The eight pro
enforce the criminal code, the provincial statutes, and the municipal laws. (Walma and West 2002). 
Also, Australia has a national police force 
against federal law. All states of Australia and the Northern territory have their own police forces that deal with 
crime under state or territory laws. (http://www.dfat. gov.au/facts/legal
America’s Constitution ensures that all the levels of government establish their separate police forces with the 
federal police enforcing the federal law, and regulating the rates charged by public service corporations. 
(http/www.history.com/encyclopedia.do).
 
5. Police Power in the Nigerian Federalism
Federalism in Nigeria has come under a great deal of scrutiny by Nigerian political scientists, scholars of allied 
disciplines as well as non-Nigerians alike, because Nigeria’s federalism (apart from its experimentation of it 
from 1954 and 1966) is nowhere near anything federalism both in theory and practice. “A federation often 
regarded as a sovereign state formed voluntarily by the union of a number of states/provinces or political units 
which retain for themselves control over local matters
The  driving force of federalism, where it is both in theory and practice like the United States of America, 
Canada, Australia, is that “the federal government did not create the states; the state c
government” (Amuwo, 1998: 6), but this is not the case with Nigeria’s federalism.
Police organization in Nigeria is antithetical to the principle of federalism. This phenomenon forks its root 
into the country’s colonial past and the natu
Police Force, most of the colonial era, served as a centralized paramilitary organization of the colonial masters 
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and also as a civilian outfit for peace and order maintenance in the colo
that: 
Up until the 1950s, the Nigeria Police Force had served as both a paramilitary of arm colonial 
rule and as a civilian outfit in the administration of peace in colonial Nigeria. It had emerged 
from the British West African Frontier Force formed in 1897 in an attempt to compel 
compliance with British colonial interests in various communities in West Africa. In addition 
to the Nigeria Police Force, Native Authorities, either on a provincial level or at a district 
level of colonial administration, had their own police formations in Northern Nigeria and 
Western Nigeria, while the Eastern Nigeria had only the Nigeria Police Force. Second, the 
minorities’ fear of domination and intimidation aborted the negotiations and d
would have engendered regionalization of the police organization the periods leading up 
Nigeria’s independence. As noted: In the debates and negotiations that accompanied the 
Constitutional restructuring of Nigeria in the 1950s, all the majorit
regionalization of the police. This would be a radical departure from previous times in which 
the Nigerian Police had a unified command. But all three regions of the North, East, and the 
West, there was a common strong opposition
the police under regional control would become a tool for oppressing them, as indeed the 
Native Authority police units had been so employed in Northern and Western Nigeria. In the 
end, the conservative and s
there was an understanding that regional government would have an input in the leadership of 
the Nigeria Police Force in their territory.
It is not surprising that the centrality of the contro
This is in spite of whatever sentiment anyone may express. For instance, provisions in section 214 to 216 are to 
the effect that the establishment of the Nigeria Police, appointments of its k
supervised. Section 215 particularly, states in sub
a) An Inspector-General of Police who, subject to Subsection 216 (2) of this constitution shall be 
appointed by President on the advice 
the Nigeria Police Force;
b) A Commissioner of Police for each state of the Federation who shall be appointed by the Police 
Service Commission. 
Sub-Section 2 states that: “The Nigeria Police force sh
Police and contingents of the Nigeria Police Force stationed in a state shall, subject to the authority of 
Inspector-general of Police, be under the command of the Commissioner of Police of that state.” 
Sub-section 3 stipulates that: “The President or such other Minister of the Government of the Federation as 
he may be authorized in that behalf, may give to the Inspector
respect to the maintenance and securi
Inspector-General of Police shall comply with those directions or cause them to be complied with.”
Subsection 4 provides: “Subject to the provisions of this section, the Governor of a 
Commissioner of the Government state as he may authorize in that behalf, may give to the Commissioner of 
Police of that state such lawful directions with respect to the maintenance and securing of public safety and  
public order within the state as he may consider necessary, and the Commissioner of Police shall comply with 
those directions or cause them to be complied with: Provided that before carrying out any such directions under 
the foregoing provisions of this subsection the Commissioner 
the President or such Minister of the Government of the Federation as may be authorized in that behalf by the 
President for his directions.” 
Sub-Section 5 provides that: “The question whether any, and if
this section shall not be inquired into any court.”
The implications of the foregoing are captured succinctly in The Nation news paper of Tuesday, March 16, 
2010. Deducing from its account, it becomes clear that, 
chief security officers only in theory not in practice. They only carry this appellation in vain as they lack the 
powers to direct the deployment of police when the need arises, without the consent of t
the centrality of police organization results in shortage in distribution of security personnel against the strength 
of the nation’s population. 
Contemporary security challenges, especially, regionally orchestrated crimes like k
terrorism by inter alia the dreaded Islamic sect 
the review of the Nigerian Constitution, as well, resurrected the debate for the strengthening of the federal 
system with regards to ‘state police’, proponents of state police has argued that it would go a long way into 
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tackling crimes that are neighborhood oriented, more so, when most of this crimes has certain regional 
peculiarities – making the Executive Governors of t
states. This is an argument that stem from the fact that national cohesion is in doubt among the diverse ethnic 
groups of Nigeria; which axiomatically houses monumental paradoxes. For instance
independence case is easily referred to substantiate the need to strangulate the debate for state police. Argument 
in this regard (against state police) is that due to lack of national cohesion also, that the regional 
brandish the availability of state police to strangulate national/central drives which they feel at odd to. There is 
also a fiscal perspective to it, arguing that the cost of maintaining the state police is a burden that most states in 
Nigeria are not equal to. What makes these arguments novel is that even most state governors who ought to be 
the protagonist of the state police creation debate have found reasons to antagonize the stance. In all the state 
police debate in Nigeria is wobbled in the following mix
self-rule, dominion mandate mentality, fallacy of financial burden, defective states nearly incapacitated without 
central government rescue. 
 
6. Concluding Remark 
Students of ethno-culturally heterogeneous cou
adequately capable of managing diversity and secure the federating people when the autonomy (by autonomy we 
mean the power of the states to enforce law and secure their people by their police fo
are ensured. Also, since Nigeria’s return to democracy on May 29, 1999, the polity has been through series of 
ethno-religious and politically motivated killings crises that wantonly claimed lives but which could have been 
nipped in the bud had the state Governors been made constitutionally chief security officers not only in theory 
but in practice. Our study also argues that a decentralized police force is one of the claims Nigeria can lay to its 
being called a “Federal Republic”; and that law and order maintenance and security of the Nigerian populace 
may only be effective when police organization is not 
a federation does not have non-centralising police power, such c
government in power sharing formula.  
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